UNITED
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## Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/6
5 January 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

**LETTER DATED 4 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TAJIKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL**

I have the honour to transmit, in annexes to this letter, the texts of the political statement at the eighteenth session of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan and the New Year's greetings by the Head of State and President of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan, Mr. Emomali Rakhmonov.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annexes circulated as documents of the Security Council.

(Signed) L. K. KAYUMOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

## Annex I

### Political Statement by the Head of State and President of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan, Mr. Emomali Rakhmonov, at the Eighteenth Session of the Twelfth Convocation of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan

As you know, the establishment of a law-based, democratic and secular State and the transition to a market economy have been the basic political and economic objective of the legitimate Government since its inception. It should be pointed out that in order to achieve this goal, the State and the Government have had, first of all, to lay the political, social, economic and cultural basis for it. Today we can tell the entire world that peace and tranquillity have triumphed in our ancient land. The people of the country and State and governmental bodies have taken encouraging steps to achieve overall harmony.

Today the time has come when we must turn from words to deeds in establishing a law-based, democratic and secular State. Accordingly, as Head of State, I announce that the new Constitution of the Republic is laying the foundation for the establishment of such a State. A great deal is being done in this area and the draft text of the new Constitution will be drawn up in the next few months. Accordingly, I believe that the Supreme Council should consider the draft new Basic Law and submit it for nationwide discussion. After the discussion and a national referendum have been completed, the final version of the draft Constitution will be adopted.

With regard to the dates for holding the referendum, I should point out that it is to be conducted no later than June 1994. The form of State government, presidential or parliamentary, will be determined through the adoption of the Basic Law. After the adoption of the Basic Law, which will specifically define the type of government in the Republic, the dates and form of the elections will be determined.

My personal view is that the elections to the highest State bodies should take place no later than the autumn of 1994. Accordingly, it is necessary to adopt a new elections act and on that basis hold free and democratic elections within the framework of the law.

I should like to refer briefly to the prospects for the Republic's economic development. I once again affirm that the only way to ensure the development of our society is through a market economy, the basis of which will be determined by various forms of ownership. The new Basic Law of the Republic must reflect this form of economy and constitute the basis for economic legislation. Thus, I declare to my compatriots and the entire world that the path which we have chosen is leading to a real democratic society.

It will be my task, as Head of State, to ensure that we proceed along the path that has been chosen. I am confident that together we shall all carry out the tasks facing us, which are aimed at enhancing the well-being of the nation and that, in doing so, we shall once again demonstrate our solidarity and unanimity and justify through good practical work the trust placed in us by the people.

## Annex II

## New Year's Greetings from the Head of State and President of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan, Mr. Emomali Rakhmonov

This is already the third time that we are celebrating the New Year under conditions in which the Republic is completely independent. The two years that have passed were not easy ones. During this time, we experienced events that will be remembered by the people for a long time to come.

The past year, in spite of economic difficulties, consolidated peace in the Republic and made it possible to preserve the integrity of our homeland and re-establish legality and law and order. Our people have undertaken constructive labour and tackled the questions of industrial production.

Unfortunately, our life today is still affected by many of the complicated problems related to those that are currently being experienced by all the peoples of the former Soviet Union. We all feel the effects of the severance of economic relations between States. The prices for food, consumer goods and fuel have risen sharply. A crisis has gripped the financial system. I felt the people's pain at numerous meetings with workers in various branches of the national economy, veterans of war and labour and members of the creative and scientific intelligentsia.

After the sixteenth session of the Supreme Council, the Republic's leaders inherited a devastated economy. It was necessary to consider basic needs and devote considerable effort to restoring what had been ruined. At the recent eighteenth session, the Supreme Council adopted a number of laws and decisions which provide a firm basis for developing the national economy.

In the coming year, we intend to radically change the principles guiding our work and focus our main efforts on production, construction, agriculture and improving the other branches of the economy linked to the well-being of the people. In the New Year, we are taking a number of measures which will help to stabilize the situation and fully guarantee the rights of citizens. A relentless struggle will be waged against speculators, criminals and mafia-type groups.

Another problem which requires unremitting attention is the return of the refugees to their homeland. We shall do everything to ensure that our fellow countrymen who are forced to live outside the Republic return home. During the visit of the Head of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, Mr. Rabbani, to our Republic, in addition to solving other major problems, we concluded an agreement on refugees together with a representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

In the New Year, it is my great wish that all the citizens of free Tajikistan, undertake, hand in hand, the task of developing the country and treat one another kindly. Let us demonstrate by our good deeds that the nation cannot be divided.

As you know, on New Year's eve I addressed the glorious Tajik people from the podium of the eighteenth session of the Supreme Council of the Republic. I consider it necessary to repeat some of the points made in that address.

The draft new Constitution of the Republic will be submitted for a nationwide referendum no later than June 1994 so that the people themselves determine the form of government that we should have in the Republic: presidential or parliamentary.

Elections to the new parliament and of the head of State will take place in the autumn. May the people freely choose the form of government for the State and its head.

All our achievements and the authority of the Republic are the results of friendship and have been brought about by the peoples living in Tajikistan. During the difficult days of the past year, Russians, Uzbeks, Kyrgyzes, Turkmens and representatives of other peoples, together with their Tajik brothers and sisters, laboured selflessly in order to restore the economy and the spiritual values of the country.

The brotherhood and friendship of the peoples of Tajikistan constitute the foundation of the young sovereign State on which the future must be built. The international spirit of the Tajik people was also demonstrated by the fact that during their comparatively brief history, they were recognized as an equal member of the world community by the 184 States Members of the United Nations.

On the eve of the New Year, I wish to express sincere appreciation to the United Nations and the leaders of the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States for their unselfish assistance and support.

Sovereign Tajikistan must complete a new stage of development in the New Year. In this connection, I confidently call upon persons with considerable life experience, veterans of war and labour, kind women and caring mothers, and our glorious youth: in the new year, let us, shoulder to shoulder, lead our Republic, through our combined efforts, out of its difficult social and economic situation. According to popular wisdom, when unity and mutual respect prevail in a family, it is possible to achieve all good things.

Thus, may the New Year, 1994, be a year of prosperity, happiness, peace and well being for us all!

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UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/7
5 January 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 4 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TAJIKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit, in the annex to this letter, information from the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan, Mr. E. Rakhmatullaev, on the results of the official visit to Tajikistan by the President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, from 19 to 23 December 1993.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) L. K. KAYUMOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

From 19 to 23 December 1993, the President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, was in the Republic of Tajikistan on an official visit.

During the visit, the high-level Tajik-Afghan talks begun during the visit by the Head of State and Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan, E. Rakhmonov, to Kabul in August this year continued. A wide range of issues, both bilateral and multilateral, was discussed at the talks. The main subjects of the talks were the problems of the return of Tajik refugees from Afghanistan and the normalization of the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border. The parties declared that they will make efforts to create the necessary conditions for the return of the Tajik refugees to their homeland.

The Republic of Tajikistan and the Islamic State of Afghanistan recognized the existing borders between the two States, and expressed their readiness to take all measures to prevent incidents on the border. They respect the inviolability of borders, and stated that they wish to see it as a border of peace, friendship and cooperation and will do everything possible to achieve this. They agreed to solve all problems that arise on the border by political means and to make joint efforts to combat smuggling of narcotics, weapons and cultural property.

During the talks, the parties expressed their readiness to develop cultural, scientific, trade and economic and other links between the two countries.

The President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan toured the country, visiting the towns of Kulyab, Khojand, Gisar and Tursunzade. Professor Rabbani was awarded honorary doctorates by the Tajik State University and the Kulyab Teacher Training University.

In conformity with the results of the talks, the two Heads of State signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-neighbourliness. The following documents were also signed:

- A boundary agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the Islamic State of Afghanistan;

- An agreement between the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the return of the Tajik refugees in the territory of Afghanistan (the agreement was signed on behalf of UNHCR by the representative of the High Commissioner in Dushanbe, Mr. P. F. Pirlot);

- An agreement on cooperation in the field of culture, science and education between the Government of Tajikistan and the Government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan;

- An agreement on the supply of natural gas to the Republic of Tajikistan from the Islamic State of Afghanistan;

- A protocol on planned cooperation between the State airline of the Republic of Tajikistan, Tojikiston, and the Ministry of Civil Aviation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (it is planned to establish air communications between the capitals of the two countries in the very near future).

The Heads of State of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Islamic State of Afghanistan expressed their satisfaction at the outcome of the visit by the State delegation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, and acknowledged that it places relations between the two countries on a qualitatively new level and will serve the development of cooperation between Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

(Signed) E. RAKHMATULLAEV
First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Tajikistan

29 December 1993

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/8
5 January 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

# LETTER DATED 4 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TAJIKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit, in the annex to the present letter, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan on the lifting of the curfew in the towns of Dushanbe, Kurgan-Tyube, Kulyab and Kalininabad, of 30 December 1993.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) L. K. KAYUMOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan on the lifting of the curfew in the towns of Dushanbe, Kurgan-Tyube, Kulyab and Kalininabad

In view of the stabilization of the situation and the many requests by citizens, and also of the beginning of a new year, 1994, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan decrees:

That the curfew shall be lifted as of 00 hours on 31 December 1993 in the towns of Dushanbe, Kurgan-Tyube, Kulyab and Kalininabad.

(Signed) E. RAHMONOV
Chairman of the Supreme Council of
the Republic of Tajikistan

Dushanbe
30 December 1993

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/9
5 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 29 DECEMBER 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993, by which the Council decided to establish the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).

In my letters of 1 November 1993 (S/26699) and 3 December 1993 (S/26850), I submitted to the Security Council the lists of Member States willing to contribute military personnel to UNAMIR. Having completed additional consultations, I propose that Romania be added to the list of contributing countries.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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**UNITED NATIONS** **S**

**Security Council**

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/10
5 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 29 December 1993 (S/1994/9) concerning the addition to the list of contributing countries for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the information contained in your letter and agree with the proposal mentioned therein.

(Signed) Karel KOVANDA
President of the Security Council

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94-00428 (E) 050194

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**UNITED NATIONS** **S**

**Security Council**

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/11
6 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 establishing the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR),

Recalling its resolutions 812 (1993) of 12 March 1993, 846 (1993) of 22 June 1993 and 891 (1993) of 20 December 1993,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General of 30 December 1993 (S/26927), in the context of the review called for in its resolution 872 (1993), as well as his previous report of 24 September 1993 (S/26488 and Add.1),

Welcoming the conclusion, on 5 November 1993, of an agreement on the status of UNAMIR and its personnel in Rwanda,

Taking note of the progress described in the Secretary-General's report of 30 December 1993 in implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement,

Welcoming further the valuable contribution to peace made in Rwanda by UNAMIR,

Noting with concern the incidents of violence in Rwanda and the consequences for Rwanda of the situation in Burundi, and urging all concerned to reaffirm their commitment to peace,

Welcoming also the joint statement made by the parties in Kinihira on 10 December 1993 concerning the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement and, in particular, the prompt establishment of a broad-based transitional government,

1. Reaffirms its approval of the Secretary-General's proposal concerning the deployment of UNAMIR as outlined in his report of 24 September 1993, including the early deployment of the second battalion to the demilitarized zone as indicated in paragraph 30 of his report of 30 December 1993;

2. Strongly urges the parties to cooperate fully in furthering the peace process, to comply fully with the Arusha Peace Agreement, on which the schedule

contained in the Secretary-General's report of 24 September 1993 is based, and in particular to establish a broad-based transitional government at the earliest opportunity in accordance with this Agreement;

3. Stresses that continued support for UNAMIR will depend upon the full and prompt implementation by the parties of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

4. Welcomes the continued efforts by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to help promote and enhance dialogue among all the parties concerned;

5. Commends the efforts of Member States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian and other assistance and urges others to provide such assistance;

6. Commends in particular the efforts of the Organization of African Unity, its member States and agencies in providing diplomatic, political, humanitarian and other support for the implementation of resolution 872 (1993);

7. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the size and cost of UNAMIR to seek economies;

8. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/12
6 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

# FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SUBMITTED IN PURSUANCE OF PARAGRAPH 4 OF RESOLUTION 886 (1993)

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## INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 886 (1993) of 18 November 1993.

## I. PROGRESS TO DATE

### A. Political aspects

2. The political mandate of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) is derived from the relevant Security Council resolutions and implemented through the framework of the Addis Ababa agreement of March 1993. This entails a delicately balanced, two-track approach: reconciliation among the national factions and promoting district and regional councils at the grass roots. Ideally, these tracks are complementary and mutually reinforcing in achieving national reconciliation and the foundation for representative governance.

#### 1. National reconciliation

3. Progress in political reconciliation and reconstruction is central to the success of development efforts and the securing of international assistance to Somalia. This message has been repeatedly conveyed by the international community to the Somali political leadership. Two primary obstacles continue to impede progress on the political level: (a) deep divisions between the two main factional alliances, the Group of 12 and the Somali National Alliance (SNA); and (b) the continued rejection by SNA of all political initiatives undertaken by UNOSOM II.

4. A recent attempt to catalyse Somali national reconciliation was made at a political meeting following the Fourth Humanitarian Conference convened by the United Nations at Addis Ababa. From 2 to 11 December 1993, at the invitation of the Ethiopian Government and with the support of UNOSOM II, representatives of the two major alliances, the Group of 12 and the Somali National Alliance, met to discuss outstanding matters and disputes between them. Despite warnings from the international community that failure to achieve progress on the political front could drive away needed foreign assistance, the factional representatives failed to agree on a structure for face-to-face talks between the faction chairmen, and the initiatives unfortunately were not successful.

5. In fact, lacking a precise agenda, the informal political meeting bogged down almost immediately after it was convened over the issue of whether or not the United Nations should play a role in the national reconciliation process. Related to this issue was the relationship between the role of the United Nations and that of the President of Ethiopia as mandated by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in this regard. Whereas SNA insisted that the United Nations had no role to play in political reconciliation, preferring this to be done by regional Powers, the Group of 12 held the view that UNOSOM II should

remain in Somalia and that the United Nations must play a key role in the Somali political process.

6. Other contributing factors to the unsuccessful outcome of the political meeting included the sharp differences of opinion between the Group of 12 and SNA over the status of the district and regional councils that had been established. Whereas the Group of 12 fully supported the legitimacy of these councils, SNA called for a fundamental review of their status and mandate. Another factor was the difference between them as to whether or not the Addis Ababa agreement should be amended. Objecting to SNA's suggestion that the Addis Ababa agreement might be revised, the Group of 12 stated that the agreement should not be altered. Even regarding an appropriate forum for national reconciliation, there was a difference of opinion. Prior to the convening of the Humanitarian Conference, SNA proposed to convene a meeting of Somalis at Mogadishu for national reconciliation during the first part of January 1994. However, this was not accepted by the Group of 12. The SNA faction has also complained that the United Nations was instigating the Group of 12 into taking actions to exclude it from the Somali national reconciliation process. Owing to clearly differing perspectives on crucial and important issues, no real discussion of these issues could take place at Addis Ababa.

7. Since returning from Addis Ababa to Somalia, the Group of 12 has organized meetings at Mogadishu as well as in various regions and issued statements expressing its views as to the next steps to be taken. Following its meeting at Mogadishu from 13 to 18 December 1993, the Group of 12 issued a resolution and an interim plan of action which, inter alia, called for the establishment of a permanent contact group for dialogue with SNA to speed up the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement. As part of the internal efforts to achieve political reconciliation, the Imam of Hirab, who covers both the Abgaal and Haber Gedir sub-clans, has been holding consultations with the two sub-clans in order to mediate for peace in Mogadishu. Parallel to this effort are other initiatives being undertaken mainly at the regional level to achieve a general reconciliation: Garowe (in the north-east), Bula-Haji (Lower Juba), Bardhera (Gedo) and Mogadishu with the Hawadle and Murusade Elders. All are requesting UNOSOM's logistical and financial support. The question of the participation and involvement of SNA remains the central point of all these initiatives.

8. A key task of UNOSOM II in the coming weeks and months will thus be to try to assist in efforts to unblock the national reconciliation process among the Somali factions. All means at UNOSOM II's disposal will be committed towards providing Somali leadership with an ample "window of opportunity" to meet and resolve their differences. Simultaneously, UNOSOM II will continue to convey the message to Somali factional leaders that the international community is not prepared to wait indefinitely for an improved security environment in which to work on behalf of the Somali people.

## 2. District councils

9. In the past two months, considerable progress has been made in the establishment of district councils throughout the country. Fourteen additional

councils have been certified during this period, bringing the total to 53 out of 81 districts (excluding the north-west). 1/ In accordance with the Addis Ababa agreement, the district councils shall be responsible for managing the affairs of the district, including public safety, health, education and reconstruction. Many of the district councils, however, lack the resources to become fully operational.

10. Strong objections were voiced by SNA in regard to efforts by UNOSOM II to set up the district and regional councils. In December, I therefore requested Under-Secretary-General James O. C. Jonah to review the methodology and procedures utilized to determine the establishment of district and regional councils. From his report to me after his conversations with a number of Somalis and actual visits in December to some of the district councils, I am satisfied that at every stage, those involved in UNOSOM ensured that the Somali people themselves were in agreement with the methods and procedures used. In actual fact, each district council was certified by the elders and only witnessed by a United Nations official. Thus it could not be argued that the district and regional councils are being imposed on the people of Somalia. In addition, the Group of 12 is fully satisfied with the methodology and procedures and has been urging that UNOSOM II complete the establishment of the district and regional councils.

11. One of the primary obstacles to the effective establishment of district councils in Somalia has been the opposition of SNA, which has refused to participate in the process and which has in some instances attempted to block the formation of councils through intimidation or the creation of shadow SNA district councils. In the greater Mogadishu area (Benadir region), the most politically sensitive area in which to form local government, efforts have already begun to establish councils in the 15 districts. The district council of Bondhere in North Mogadishu was certified on 6 December 1993. Since then, consultations have been undertaken in the Wadajir and Dharkenley districts in South Mogadishu; Karan, Yaqshid and Shibis in North Mogadishu; and Waeberi and Hamar Jab-jab in Central Mogadishu. UNOSOM II will proceed with its efforts in this area with cautious deliberation in view of the prevailing circumstances.

12. In addition to establishing additional district councils, efforts are continuing with a view to strengthening those councils already established. An inter-divisional team of UNOSOM II staff has been paying visits to each district to assess the particular support needed by local governments. Assistance from various donor countries and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has been essential in the provision of starter kits - basic office supplies and furniture - for the district councils. While most of these councils face predictable problems in their initial phase of operation, they represent an important step towards re-establishing viable and representative government in Somalia.

### 3. Regional councils

13. Since my last report, two additional regional councils have also been formed, bringing the total number of regional councils to 8 out of the 13 in Somalia, excluding the north-west. Three more regional councils, in Bari,

Lower Juba and Mudug, are expected to be inaugurated soon. Only in the Middle Juba is the process facing obstacles, owing to a deteriorating security situation in two of the three districts there. Efforts are being made to stabilize the situation in that region with the aim of establishing councils in the two districts in question. In accordance with the Addis Ababa agreement, the regional councils shall be entrusted primarily with the task of implementing humanitarian, social and economic programmes in coordination with the Transitional National Council (TNC) and will also assist in the conduct of the internationally supervised census. In addition to maintaining liaison with UNOSOM II, United Nations specialized agencies, NGOs and other relevant organizations directly and through the central administrative departments and the TNC, the regional councils shall also be responsible for law and order at the regional level.

## 4. Transitional National Council

14. With the exception of the United Somali Congress (USC)/SNA faction, participants in the recent Addis Ababa political meetings expressed a strong intention to work towards the rapid establishment of the TNC. It is my hope to see the TNC established shortly, in accordance with the Addis Ababa agreement of March 1993. There is broad commitment among most sections of the Somali political spectrum for this crucial step towards the re-establishment of Somali sovereignty. Nevertheless, again reflecting the basic disagreements among the Somali factions regarding the status of the district and regional councils, strong objections were raised by SNA to the effort to establish the TNC.

15. At present UNOSOM II has received nine nominations for representatives from the 15 political factions, each of which may nominate one representative to the TNC. In addition, regional councils, which nominate three representatives each, have begun deliberations for the selection of their representatives to the TNC.

16. According to the March 1993 Addis Ababa agreement, progress towards the establishment of the TNC is a critical step in accelerating the assumption by Somalis of responsibility for political and economic processes. Once formed, the TNC can begin to address the many governmental and legal issues involved in the rehabilitation of Somali governance which go beyond UNOSOM II's mandate.

## 5. Police and justice

17. Progress has been made in the re-establishment of police forces and justice systems in Somalia, both of which are critical for the return of functional Somali governance and public order. This is particularly important in the north-east, where at present no United Nations military forces have been deployed. Pursuant to Security Council resolutions 814 (1993), 865 (1993) and 886 (1993), Unified Task Force (UNITAF)/UNOSOM II has now re-established 107 police stations in Somalia's districts, with one district court, one regional court and one appeal court functioning in Mogadishu, and 15 district courts, 5 regional courts and 5 courts of appeal re-established in the north-west. Both Mogadishu Central Prison and Hargeisa Prison are already functioning. Nationally, there are now 6,737 policemen at the regional and district levels,

311 judicial personnel in 8 regions and 26 districts, and over 700 prison officers in two regions.

18. The police, judicial and penal systems are still very fragile. It is imperative to consolidate and enhance these systems in order to secure law and order. With the mandate to accelerate the process of assumption by Somalis of the operations of the police and judicial systems, UNOSOM II plans to involve Somali police, prison, judicial and social service personnel in advisory capacities during this phase of the justice programme.

19. In order to enhance security, the Mogadishu police stations have been supplied with radio links among themselves and with the UNOSOM II forces Provost Marshal's Office. This will facilitate coordination between the Somali police and UNOSOM military. It is also planned to put in place a Somali police rapid deployment force known as Darawishta by March 1994. These improvements will allow reduction of the involvement of UNOSOM II military forces in the role of policing.

## B. Humanitarian situation

20. Since my last report, UNOSOM II has renewed its effort to place humanitarian programmes at the forefront of its work in Somalia. This initiative was highlighted at the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, held at Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993. Somali delegates and international donors reaffirmed their commitment to accelerate Somali control of the recovery and development process.

### 1. The continuing emergency

21. Though the fight to end famine in Somalia has been successful, several indicators suggest that in the past few months malnutrition levels are again on the rise in parts of Somalia, including Mogadishu and the Juba valley, two areas of ongoing conflict and insecurity. In the lower Juba valley, levels of acute malnutrition among children under five has doubled to 20 per cent. Targeting these vulnerable populations in spite of challenging security problems remains a top commitment of UNOSOM's humanitarian division and the NGOs, United Nations agencies and military forces with which it collaborates. Collectively these organizations have stepped up efforts in the past two months to provide emergency food relief and medical treatment wherever it is needed; notably, assistance has been provided to flood victims in the north-east of Somalia, to Ethiopian refugees in Mogadishu, to the disabled, orphans and schoolchildren and to returning refugees in the Juba valley.

### 2. Resettlement

22. UNOSOM II has continued to cooperate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other agencies to facilitate the safe and orderly return of Somali refugees and internally displaced persons. Successful resettlement projects have been particularly in evidence in the Juba

valley, where since October over 3,000 persons have returned from camps in Kenya, Kismayo and Mogadishu. Careful monitoring and follow-up by cooperating agencies have ensured that these movements have occurred without significant setbacks. Insecurity in parts of Somalia has slowed and complicated resettlement programmes. None the less, assisting Somali families to return to their homes remains a top priority.

### 3. The Addis Ababa Declaration

23. In a significant step towards handing over to the Somalis the responsibility for the recovery of their country, representatives from Somali regions, political movements and the international donor community agreed at Addis Ababa on a regionally based strategy for the establishment of mechanisms for resource mobilization and allocation and the development of programmes and projects. The regional focus is an important step towards directing international development resources to those communities which have succeeded in creating and maintaining a secure environment in which development efforts can take place.

24. The strategy now being followed by the Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM II rests on the following six principal approaches agreed upon at the meeting in Addis Ababa:

(a) Essential emergency assistance is unconditional and will continue to be provided to vulnerable groups;

(b) Rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance will only be provided where stability and security exist;

(c) Involvement of Somalis in all stages of rehabilitation and reconstruction is essential. Somali control of the process is a prerequisite to donor assistance;

(d) Every effort must be made to ensure that rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts are sustainable;

(e) All actions in the reconstruction and rehabilitation process should contribute to the enhancement of efficient operations of the private sector in a free and open market system;

(f) The donor community will be fully supportive of the mechanisms being set up to determine rehabilitation priorities, funding modalities and implementation.

25. Broad agreements were reached at the Addis Ababa meeting regarding mechanisms which would facilitate the implementation of the provisions of the Declaration. Development committees will be established in the various regions and will be responsible for giving priority to regional development activities and for mobilizing resources from communities in support of those activities. A Development Council, composed of representatives of the regional development committees, will be formed to develop a mechanism for mobilizing resources and

providing criteria for the allocation of those resources across regions and sectors. An Aid Coordination Body is to be set up to coordinate donor assistance to Somalia. It is envisaged that this body will comprise representatives of donors, United Nations agencies and programmes, NGOs, other multilateral and African institutions and organizations and possibly countries in the region. The United Nations Office of Development, under the umbrella of the Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM, will provide technical support for the regional development committees and serve as a secretariat for the Development Council and for the Aid Coordinating Body. The Office will embrace the skills and experience of Somali professionals, United Nations agencies and NGOs.

26. As agreed at the Addis Ababa meeting, a plan of action to guide the implementation of the provisions of the Addis Ababa Declaration is currently being finalized. It is intended to initiate implementing the regionally based strategy in those regions where a large measure of stability and security prevails. Combined United Nations/NGO/donor missions will be launched to each of these regions.

### 4. The impact of insecurity

27. Humanitarian programmes continue to face challenging security problems in Somalia. Insecurity in parts of the country, coupled with slow progress in political rehabilitation and reconciliation, has adversely affected humanitarian work. Under these circumstances, donors are reluctant to commit funding; NGOs sometimes suspend or withdraw operations for reasons of staff safety; agencies have difficulty recruiting and retaining qualified international staff; and costs of relief and development operations soar, owing in part to additional security requirements. Collectively these by-products of the political impasse have hampered UNOSOM II's efforts to move forward with humanitarian initiatives.

## C. Security issues

28. Since my last report in mid-November (S/26738), the security situation in many parts of Somalia has given rise to concern. Outside Mogadishu, endemic banditry continues to plague parts of the countryside. Outbreaks of localized inter-clan fighting have occurred, most notably in the contested portions of Lower Shabelle and the Lower and Middle Juba regions. A number of recent security incidents involving threats and actual attacks against international agencies in outlying regions has led to the temporary cessation of operations of a number of NGOs in the Lower Juba region and all of the NGOs in the Saakow district (Middle Juba region). Despite these incidents, however, the countryside continues to enjoy a level of security far superior to that of 18 months ago.

29. The Mogadishu area, in particular, remains tense. While direct armed confrontation between the SNA and UNOSOM II forces has been avoided, armed banditry on the streets of Mogadishu has grown considerably, making movement for Somali commercial traffic, UNOSOM personnel and international humanitarian relief supplies increasingly dangerous. In a number of separate incidents, casualties have been suffered by UNOSOM civilian and NGO staff, both

international and local, on the streets of Mogadishu. Armed robbery directed at UNOSOM II or NGO vehicles and property is on the rise as well and often causes casualties. As a result, there has been a significant reduction in the presence of international NGOs willing to work in the current environment in Mogadishu.

30. Security for international staff remains a troublesome issue. UNOSOM remains at phase IV of the Security Evacuation Plan. Travel for all staff in and around Mogadishu is under armed escort only, with many areas of the city being out of bounds. The previous practice of hiring private cars until UNOSOM II received its United Nations-type vehicles has created a difficult problem owing to the frequent threats if an attempt is made to replace a civilian hired car with a United Nations vehicle. Hijacking of United Nations vehicles continues. A concerted effort is being made to provide sufficient hard-cover offices and sleeping areas in both South and North Mogadishu to reduce the risk of injury if there should be a resumption of hostilities. The long hours of work, the restricted travel, the substandard accommodation in many sites throughout Somalia, the inexperience of some staff and the constant security threat make it increasingly difficult to retain staff beyond a six-month initial assignment. Thus, there is a constant need to train new staff and at any one time there are a limited number of staff with institutional memory.

### 1. Disarmament and demobilization

31. It has been clear from the outset that general disarmament, beginning with the heavy weapons, is a necessary precondition for the establishment of the peaceful and secure environment which is required in order to facilitate national reconciliation, rehabilitation and economic reconstruction. During the meeting held at Addis Ababa in January 1993, all the Somali parties had agreed that disarmament was essential to the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia. This fundamental objective was clearly reaffirmed in the Addis Ababa agreement of March 1993 by which the parties, inter alia, invited UNOSOM II to assist in the disarmament process and take appropriate action against those who might violate these provisions of the agreement.

32. Unfortunately, the commitments made at Addis Ababa have not been honoured by the Somali parties. In accordance with the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council, and after deliberate attacks against it by one of the Somali parties, UNOSOM II tried to bring about disarmament through coercive means. However, as the members of the Security Council are aware, this course of action has proved to be impracticable.

33. Following the adoption of resolution 865 (1993), UNOSOM has sought to convince the Somali parties to undertake the disarmament process on a voluntary basis. It has developed plans to provide vocational training for young militiamen following their demobilization and is preparing the establishment of training centres in Mogadishu and in the Baidoa area to train demobilized personnel in skills that will help them reintegrate into society. It is intended that these centres will be operated and managed by the Somalis themselves, albeit with the initial involvement of UNOSOM II and the assistance of the relevant United Nations agencies.

34. Clearly, however, voluntary disarmament can only be successful if the Somali parties display the necessary courage and determination to put their recent past behind them and resolutely embark upon the difficult but challenging process of political reconciliation, institution-building and economic rehabilitation. Unfortunately, there are growing indications that the major factions are actively rearming in anticipation of renewed hostilities in the coming months. In Mogadishu, reports indicate that certain clans are replenishing their weapons supplies. It is also reported that clans are erecting defensive positions within the areas they consider as key strategic strongholds in the city. There also appears to be a build-up of troops in the Kismayo region south of Mogadishu.

35. The unwillingness of the parties to engage in a meaningful process of disarmament, at least at this time, regrettably shows that the present insecurity in Mogadishu and, to a lesser degree, in other parts of Somalia will continue to be a serious concern in the months ahead. I therefore wish to appeal to the parties to recommit themselves to the disarmament process agreed upon during the January and March 1993 meetings at Addis Ababa and to work constructively with UNOSOM II in order to determine the modalities for the concrete implementation of these commitments.

### 2. De-mining

36. De-mining operations, urgently needed in parts of Somalia, require a degree of political stability and security that has frequently been absent precisely in those regions most in need of such operations. In the north-west, de-mining projects conducted by a professional international mine-clearing firm have continued in spite of a shortage of donor funding. Elsewhere in Somalia, insecurity has precluded the option of bringing in professional assistance from abroad to manage mine clearance. UNOSOM II is now exploring the possibility of facilitating local "self-help" mine-clearing endeavours where security permits and where Somali communities seek assistance.

### 3. Deployment

37. In a previous report (S/26317), I had indicated that an additional brigade would be required to enable UNOSOM II to accomplish the tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council. This would have brought the authorized troops strength of UNOSOM II to over 32,000 all ranks. However, over the past few months, a number of Governments, including Belgium, France and Sweden, have informed me of their intention to withdraw their contingents from UNOSOM II by the end of December 1993. Moreover, on 6 October the United States of America announced that it would withdraw its troops from Somalia by the end of March 1994. Accordingly, the French contingent (1,100 all ranks), the Belgian contingent (950 all ranks) and the Swedish Field Hospital (150 all ranks) were withdrawn from Somalia in December 1993. In addition, the United States withdrew 1,400 military logistics personnel at the end of December. As a result, the strength of UNOSOM II on 1 January 1994 was 25,945.

38. Four other Member States have given advance notice to the United Nations of the withdrawal of their contingents before the end of March 1994: Italy (2,300), Germany (1,350), Turkey (320) and Norway (140). The United States also will withdraw the rest of its military logistics personnel (1,400) by the end of March 1994.

39. The total of the withdrawals in paragraphs 37 and 38 above amounts to 9,110. This figure does not include the United States Quick Reaction Force (1,350), which will also be withdrawn at that time.

40. On the above basis, the troop strength available at the end of March 1994 will be 19,700. Two Member States have indicated their intention to deploy a total of 2,300 additional military personnel. However, the actual date of deployment is not known at this time.

### D. Administrative questions

41. Administratively, UNOSOM II continues to face challenges related to the difficult working and security environment in South Mogadishu. The international staff of 199 currently assigned to the UNOSOM II Administration Division is insufficient to perform all the tasks assigned, and in particular, to ensure adequate control and management of financial accounts, supervision and registration of United Nations inventory, control of procurement activity and provision of timely management information.

42. While UNOSOM II makes every effort to pursue local purchases whenever feasible, virtually no material of suitable quantity or quality is available locally. Nearly all logistic support other than some service contracts must be purchased internationally. This fact, combined with the size of Somalia and the poor roads, necessitates an enormous airlift capability. Air rental and aviation fuel alone cost approximately US$ 6.3 million per month.

43. The withdrawal of United States forces and the transfer of logistic support for all of UNOSOM II made it necessary to continue arrangements with an American contractor, which had initially been selected by the United States Government. Requests over the last two months to 42 Governments for logistical units have brought no positive response. The contract with the United States contractor was presented to, and recommended by, the Headquarters Committee on Contracts in accordance with the United Nations Financial Regulations and Rules. The contract is for a cost of approximately US$ 32 million for a period of four months until the end of March 1994, during which period alternatives will be explored. By 28 December 1993, the contractor was in a position to provide supply support, produce and deliver water, provide short and long road transport for passengers and cargo and maintain facilities, roads and utilities.

## II. OBSERVATIONS

44. The preceding sections of the present report describe the results achieved by UNOSOM II in fulfilling its mandate in the three interrelated fields, viz., political, humanitarian and security. While progress has been achieved, the

mandate of UNOSOM II is far from being fully accomplished. I would consider UNOSOM II's mandate as being completed only when the Addis Ababa agreement of March 1993 is fully implemented, culminating in the holding of general elections and the installation of a popularly elected Government. This is predicated on the fulfilment of two indispensable conditions: a spirit of cooperation, compromise and commitment on the part of the Somali people and the continued involvement of the international community.

45. As far as the international community is concerned, it has given ample evidence of its concern for the suffering people of Somalia. Nations around the world have sent their men and women to serve in Somalia with UNOSOM I, UNITAF or UNOSOM II or with one of the intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. Many lives have been lost, both military and civilian, in the search for peace and stability in Somalia. States Members of the United Nations have invested huge sums of money in an operation which has literally saved hundreds of thousands of lives, especially among the most vulnerable sections of Somali society. This sacrifice is indeed remarkable, particularly when put in the perspective of the international community having to make available immense resources, human and material, for many other United Nations operations in different parts of the world, and keeping in mind the severe economic difficulties which many countries, developing and developed, have been experiencing for the past few years.

46. However, there are unmistakable signs of fatigue among the international community as it continues to be called upon to extend such assistance through the United Nations. This is reflected in the increasing delays in obtaining personnel from Member States and even longer delays in obtaining their financial contributions.

47. At the same time, I am convinced that the international community does not wish to shirk its responsibility towards the Somali people. At the Fourth Humanitarian Conference held at Addis Ababa in November/December last year, representatives of the donor community reiterated their willingness to help Somalia in its national rehabilitation and reconstruction. But they made it clear that their offer to commit further resources was conditional on the Somalis doing their part in bringing about national reconciliation and establishing at least minimum levels of security. The response of the international community would be proportionate to the determination, maturity and wisdom displayed by the Somali people and their leaders in resolving their differences, through dialogue rather than through resort to the use of arms, and to their cooperation with the collective efforts of the international community to help them. This would certainly be true for assistance in reconstruction and development. However, as far as providing troops and finances for UNOSOM II is concerned, the fatigue I referred to above seems unlikely to dissipate altogether or soon.

48. The agreement signed in Addis Ababa in March 1993 offers the only agreed framework within which a solution to Somalia's manifold problems would have to be found. That agreement was signed by the leaders of the 15 political parties, which now seem to be divided into two groups competing for political influence and domination. The March 1993 agreement remains valid and can only be modified with the consent of all the 15 factions. UNOSOM II cannot and will not stand in

the way should the parties to the Addis Ababa agreement voluntarily decide to modify its terms. However, until that happens, it is incumbent on all the factions to adhere to it.

49. UNOSOM II is on the side of the Somali people. Its only endeavour is to help the people of Somalia so that they can once again be the effective masters of their destiny. UNOSOM II does not and will not take sides among various factions. UNOSOM II, of course, welcomes the cooperation which it has received over the past several months from the Group of 12. UNOSOM II looks forward to receiving similar cooperation from USC/SNA. The Group of 12 insists on UNOSOM staying on in Somalia and persevering with its mandate. This is also the view of the regional States as well as of the Organization of African Unity. It is only SNA which has a negative, even hostile, attitude towards UNOSOM II. My position is clear: the international community must not abandon the people of Somalia as long as an overwhelming majority of them desire the presence of the United Nations.

50. The main focus of UNOSOM II's activities in the period ahead will be on promoting Somali initiatives in the political, security and nation-building process. That process must be a Somali process and every effort is and will continue to be made to help the Somalis assume responsibility for it. After the traumatic experiences they have gone through over the past two years, it would not be reasonable to expect the Somali people to undertake such a heavy responsibility in a short period of time. They will have to be given the necessary encouragement and support for some more time.

51. This additional period would be utilized by UNOSOM II to create a sustainable momentum in the task of political reconciliation, establishment of a Somali police and justice system and laying the foundation for an effective system of civil, financial and economic adminstration at the local, regional and central levels.

52. It is my considered assessment that without the continued stabilizing presence of an adequate United Nations force, there would be an early resumption of civil strife and an unravelling of all that has been achieved at the cost of so much sacrifice, human and material. What can be achieved will therefore depend on the willingness of Member States to see the Somalia operation to its successful conclusion, so that the people of Somalia can look forward to a reasonably promising future after so many years of suffering and strife.

53. It is, however, extremely doubtful whether the required level of resources will be available after 31 March 1994. As has been pointed out above, the military strength of UNOSOM II will be down to 19,700 by the end of March this year. It should be kept in mind that UNOSOM II will be deprived of the specialized capabilities which had been available to several of the withdrawing contingents, as well as of the United States Quick Reaction Force, which will also have withdrawn at that time. I have approached a large number of Member States with a view to obtaining their contributions to UNOSOM II's military component. The United States has also made efforts in this regard. However, as of the date of the present report, not a single positive response has been received. While the possibility of some offers of new or additional troops should not be ruled out, it would be prudent at this stage to assume that the

force level at the disposal of UNOSOM II after 31 March 1994 will not be much more than 19,700, and could even be less.

54. The question of the availability of timely and adequate financing for UNOSOM II operations is another important factor which must be taken into account. The United Nations has already spent US$ 765 million for UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II so far. The cost of UNOSOM II operations for the period from 1 November 1993 to 31 March 1994 is estimated at US$ 413.5 million. 2/ As of 31 December 1993, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNOSOM Special Account amounted to US$ 100 million. The non-payment or late payment of assessed contributions makes it impossible for Member States to be reimbursed for their contribution to UNOSOM II. This, in turn, adversely affects the willingness of Member States either to maintain their contributions or to increase them or send new contingents, not only for a particular operation but to United Nations peace-keeping operations in general.

55. In my report of 12 November 1993 (S/26738), I outlined three options relating to the mandate and functioning of UNOSOM II as regards security. Whatever option is selected, the United Nations will continue its efforts to promote national reconciliation and institution-building.

- The first option is a continuation of UNOSOM II's current mandate, with the addition of an extra brigade. It would call for disarmament, coercive if necessary, as well as a capability for defence against attacks against UNOSOM II personnel;

- The second option calls for voluntary disarmament and the deployment of about 16,000 troops to protect ports, convoys and refugees;

- The third option calls for the deployment of only 5,000 troops, which would keep control over Mogadishu port and airport as well as other important ports and airports.

56. My preference would be for the first option, since I am convinced that only a comprehensive mandate, as laid down by the Security Council in its various resolutions, would make it possible for UNOSOM II to create a secure environment and to accelerate its efforts to help the Somali people as they move along the process of national reconciliation and institution-building. However, for all the reasons that I have explained above, the first option will have to be excluded. Indeed, I am not even confident that UNOSOM II will have adequate human, material and financial resources or that the Somali leaders will have advanced enough on the road of national reconciliation to be able to undertake all the activities envisaged even under the second option as described in my previous report. This is mainly a result of the continued negative attitude of SNA towards UNOSOM II, reports of an arms build-up by all the factions in Somalia and the revival of inter-clan fighting and increased banditry.

57. I would therefore recommend the second option for the consideration of the Security Council. Under that option, UNOSOM II would not use coercive methods but would rely on the cooperation of the Somali parties. In the event that inter-clan fighting resumes in different parts of the country, UNOSOM II, while not becoming involved in it, will retain some capability to defend its personnel

if circumstances so warrant. UNOSOM II would protect the important ports and airports in the country as well as the essential infrastructure of Somalia; keep open the main supply routes between Mogadishu and outside areas; pursue as a matter of utmost priority the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial systems; and help with the repatriation of refugees. As far as the humanitarian aspects are concerned, UNOSOM II will continue its efforts to provide emergency relief supplies to all in need throughout the country. With respect to rehabilitation and development, UNOSOM II will coordinate its activities in such a manner that programmes of assistance of the international community are supported in areas of their choice. As members of the Security Council are aware, the donor community made it very clear at the Fourth Humanitarian Conference in Addis Ababa that aid would go only to those regions where security prevailed and where counterpart Somali institutions were available. As far as the political processes in Somalia are concerned, UNOSOM II will continue to play a role as desired by the Somali people.

58. The number of troops required under this option would be of the order of 16,000 all ranks and the necessary support element. If this order of troop strength is not available or if the necessary financial resources are not available after 31 March 1994, I will bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council with, possibly, a modified recommendation regarding the mandate of UNOSOM II.

59. I should like to sound a note of caution and concern. As I have stated in paragraph 56 above, my preference continues to be for the first option. The success of UNOSOM II under the modified second option, as enunciated in paragraph 57 above, will depend, more than ever before, on the cooperation of the Somali parties. It is difficult to predict the course of action which different Somali factions might embark upon during the period following 31 March 1994. This would largely depend on their perception of UNOSOM II's capability to discharge its functions effectively. It is indispensable for all concerned to promote national reconciliation in parallel with the re-establishment and strengthening of the Somali institutions of police and justice. Should these efforts fail, we might witness renewed fighting and civil war in Somalia.

60. There is another, positive contingency that we should take into consideration. If the Somalis succeed in establishing the TNC in the near future, that would be a significant development. The international community would watch with interest the functioning of the TNC. In case the TNC is able to function reasonably effectively through the Somali institutions of local self-government, it might have a bearing on the mandate of UNOSOM II. I shall naturally bring any such development to the attention of the Security Council.

61. As I conclude this report, I wish to reiterate my deep appreciation to my Special Representative, Admiral Jonathan Howe, to my Deputy Special Representative, Ambassador Lansana Kouyate, to the Commander of the United Nations Force, General Cevik Bir, and to the UNOSOM II soldiers of all ranks who have served the United Nations, with courage and devotion, in extremely difficult and dangerous circumstances. I also wish to convey my sincere gratitude to the men and women of the United Nations Secretariat who have served the cause of peace and humanitarian assistance in Somalia in some of the most

dangerous conditions ever confronted by United Nations civilian personnel. I further wish to pay tribute to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the NGOs and to the participating agencies and programmes of the United Nations system, as well as to Governments which have extended direct assistance to the Somali people, thus supplementing the efforts of UNOSOM II. Above all, I pay tribute to the international and Somali personnel of UNOSOM II who made the supreme sacrifice in seeking to bring the help of the international community and the United Nations to the people of Somalia.

## Notes

1/ The legal status of several districts is still the subject of discussions between UNOSOM II and local Somali communities. As a result, the total number of districts said to exist in Somalia may vary.

2/ A/48/777, para. 7.

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UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/13
7 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

# LETTER DATED 6 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following instances of violations by Iraq of the terms of the cease-fire between the two countries.

1. On 1 September 1993, a number of anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and penetrated deep into Iranian territory. They entered the village of Kordak Shaneh in the Naghadeh area at the geographical coordinates of NF 2373 on the map of Mahabad and threatened to hurt the villagers if they cooperated with the Government in any way.

2. On 5 September 1993, at 2030 hours, anti-revolutionary elements, taking advantage of the night, engaged in battle with Iranian forces at the geographical coordinates of 872-675 on the map of Baneh, south of Nahni Heights, north of border pillar 98/4, east of Siranband and west of Hang Jal. As a result, three members of the Iranian forces were injured and three others were martyred.

3. On 6 September 1993, at 1700 hours, several anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and penetrated into Iranian territory at the geographical coordinates of NE 4797 on the map of Barisoo, at the village of Kani, where they fired at an Iranian vehicle belonging to the Geographic Institute. The vehicle was passing through the village when it became the target of an RPG-7 shell. The shooting led to the explosion of the vehicle whose three passengers were martyred.

4. On 7 September 1993, at 1415 hours, a tugboat carrying the Iraqi flag, without a name and without a port of registration, sailed opposite the Khorramshahr Port facilities and moved towards Basra Port.

5. On 8 September 1993, between 0940 and 0948 hours, Iraqi forces stationed at Meimak Heights at the geographical coordinates of NC 842193 on the map of Halaleh, in no man's land north of border pillar 35/8, caused three consecutive explosions.

6. On 9 September 1993, at 1010 hours, eight Iraqi military officers in four vehicles were seen scouting the area at the geographical coordinates of 42-04 on the map of Khosravi, in no man's land, south of border pillar 53/2 and Manzarieh sentry post in Iraq.

7. On 10 and 11 September 1993, Iraqi forces at the geographical coordinates of 66250-12900 on the map of Saeedieh were engaged in increased engineering activities using 20 compressors, two loaders, and two bulldozers. They were building a road at the geographical coordinates of 66000-12400 on the map of Saeedieh. Thirty patrol vehicles were also spotted in the area.

8. On 10 September 1993, at 0130 hours, at the geographical coordinates of 082-950 on the map of Meimeh River, Iranian forces confronted three anti-revolutionary elements who had crossed the border and penetrated into Iranian territory north of border pillars 22/49 and 22/50. Those elements retreated into Iraq under cover of the night.

9. On 10 September 1993, between 0645 and 0945 hours, Iraqi military forces stationed at the other side of the border fired in the direction of Iranian forces. The bullets hit the area at the geographical coordinates of 15200-88300 on the map of station-90 in no man's land, east of border pillar 7/4 inside Iranian territory.

10. On 11 September 1993, at 0830 hours, a grey Iraqi military helicopter was flying at an altitude of 500 metres opposite the geographical coordinates of 55750-19600 on the map of Fao at the mouth of the Persian Gulf.

11. On 12 September 1993, between 0945 and 1015 hours, a grey Iraqi military helicopter was reconnoitring at the geographical coordinates of 55750-19600 on the map of Fao and then flew towards Fao and Basra.

12. On 13 September 1993, at 0900 hours, seven Iraqi military personnel were seen digging a canal at the geographical coordinates of 414-628 on the map of Naftshahr in no man's land, south of Naftshahr airport in Iraq and Height 170.

13. On 13 September 1993, at 1005 hours, 16 Iraqi military personnel in three vehicles entered the area at the geographical coordinates of 459-992 on the map of Khosravi in no man's land, south of border pillar 51 and north of Chirzard.

14. On 14 September an Iranian vehicle was passing the vicinity of Yaquobabad Fork at the geographical coordinates of NE 6668 on the map of Garmab, south of Soorkooh Heights and border pillar 1/4 and 1, when anti-revolutionaries, who had penetrated into Iranian territory, attacked the vehicle. As a result, three military personnel were wounded. The bandits finally returned to Iraqi territory.

15. On 14 September 1993, 20 anti-revolutionaries crossed the border and penetrated into Iranian territory within 12 kilometres east of border pillar 117/7G, at the geographical coordinates of 16-48 on the map of Piranshahr and the village of Lower Badinabad. They then left the area and returned to Iraq.

16. On 15 September 1993, at 2010 hours, a number of anti-revolutionary elements took advantage of the night and attacked Iranian forces at the geographical coordinates of 87-67 on the map of Baneh, south of Nahni Heights, north of border pillar 98/4, east of Siranband, and west of Hang Jal. As a result, one member of the Iranian forces was wounded and two were martyred.

17. On 16 September 1993 at 1820 hours, three Iranian military vehicles and a private vehicle passing through Zarrab village and Khan Agah in Sarvabad area, south-east of Marivan at the geographical coordinates of 27-04 on the map of Baneh, were engaged in battle with anti-revolutionary elements who had penetrated into Iranian territory. As a result, two anti-revolutionaries were wounded and fled, three members of the Iranian forces were martyred and three vehicles were set ablaze.

18. On 16 September 1993, Iraqi forces built a 10-person sentry post at the geographical coordinates of 632-288 on the map of Kani Sheikh south-west of border pillars 39/5 and 39/6.

19. On 16 September 1993, at 1340 hours, Iraqi forces installed a Dooshka cannon approximately 1700 metres south of Mohammad Qasem sentry post, opposite the sentry post of Farrokhabad in Iran, at the geographical coordinates of PB 07200-68800 on the map of Mehran.

20. On 17 September 1993, at 1700 hours, an Iranian Toyota vehicle driven by soldier Koroush Fadaee, accompanied by first sergeant Mohammad Bagher Ya'ghobi and soldier Abdolsattar Jafari, returning from a mission to take foodstuff to Kani Sheikh sentry post, was ambushed by anti-revolutionaries who had penetrated into Iranian territory at the geographical coordinates of 6188-3460 on the map of Kani Sheikh, north-east of Kani Sheikh sentry post and border pillar 40/2. As a result, Mohammad Bagher Ya'ghobi, who had been shot in the neck and in the abdomen, was martyred and two other soldiers were taken captive.

21. On 18 September 1993, at 0700 hours, 15 Iraqi military personnel set up two communal tents at the geographical coordinates of NC 683241 on the map of Kani Sheikh in no man's land, south-east of border pillar 39/2 and north-east of border pillar 39/1.

22. On 19 September 1993, between 1025 and 1030 hours, Iraqi forces fired four flare bullets at the geographical coordinates of QA 6827 on the map of Chazzabeh, north and north-east of border pillar 18 and 18/1.

23. On 19 September 1993, 30 anti-revolutionary elements armed with light and semi-light weapons crossed the border and penetrated into Iranian territory at the geographical coordinates of NE 4387 on the map of Sardasht, north of the border river of Gelass in the vicinity of Islamabad village, east of Bijveh. They were pursued after they were spotted by Iranian forces. They subsequently returned to Iraqi territory.

24. On 19 September 1993, 35 anti-revolutionary elements armed with light and semi-light weapons crossed the border and entered Iranian territory at the geographical coordinates of NE 4385 on the map of Sardasht. They entered the village of Mazanabad, north of Talesh Height and south-west of Kouhe Noori, east

of border pillars 103/3 and 104 at the geographical coordinates of 35100-87500 on the map of Sardasht. These elements returned to Iraqi territory after they were pursued by Iranian forces.

25. On 20 September 1993, at 1620 hours, a speed boat with four Iraqi armed civilians on board who had already violated the Iranian waters was seen at the geographical coordinates of TP 75000-31200 on the map of Joeepdeh, east of Abadan Island, at the intersection of Arvandrood and Bahmanshir. Those persons opened fire at the Iranian forces and after facing Iranian reaction returned to Iraq.

26. On 20 September 1993, at 1300 hours, two Iraqi helicopters were seen flying from the direction of the city of Al-Nasr at the geographical coordinates of NC 41200-53250 on the map of southern Naftshahr, approximately 2.5 kilometres south of border pillar 44/13 towards the post located at the geographical coordinates of NC 37500-60100 on the map of southern Naftshahr, at border pillar 46 at the point where the rivers of Konkagoosh and Gonehkabood intersect in no man's land. After being spotted in the border airspace, the helicopters flew towards the south-western part of Al-Nasr.

27. On 20 September 1993, 14 anti-revolutionaries crossed the border and penetrated into Iranian territory in the vicinity of the village of Shandaravkani (Kani Bid) at the geographical coordinates of NF 5603 and NE 4999 and 4797 on the map of Barisoo. These elements were pursued by Iranian forces and returned to Iraq.

28. On 20 September at 1300 hours, three Iraqi helicopters were seen flying from the geographical coordinates of NC 3456 on the map of southern Naftshahr, south-west of border pillar 46 and west of border pillar 45 and the geographical coordinates of NC 4163 on the map of Naftshahr, west of the border river of Gonehkabood. These helicopters were then re-routed in the direction of Mandali, deep inside Iraqi territory.

29. On 20 September 1993, eight anti-revolutionary elements were seen crossing the border and entered Iranian territory, at the village of Gharna at the geographical coordinates of NF 2885 on the map of Mahabad. These elements returned to Iraqi territory after they were pursued by Iranian forces.

30. On 21 September 1993, at 1220 hours, an Iraqi helicopter was seen flying at the geographical coordinates of NC 3760 on the map of southern Naftshahr in no man's land, where the border rivers of Gonehkabood and Kankagoosh meet, north-west of border pillar 46.

31. On 21 September 1993, at 1300 hours, 12 Iraqi military personnel were seen installing barbed wire at the geographical coordinates of ND 431023 on the map of Khosravi, south-west of border pillar 53/1.

32. On 21 September 1993, at 1500 hours and 1800 hours, a number of anti-revolutionary elements were seen crossing the border and entering Iranian territory at the geographical coordinates of NF 3207 on the map of Sardasht, north of Pardehpahn, north-east of border pillar 109/1 and Bolfat Mount, at the geographical coordinates of NF 3701 on the map of Sardasht, south of Kasseh

Shekan Mount, west of Rostam Alban and east of Dopaza Mount, south-east of Bivaran. These elements returned to Iraqi territory when they were pursued by Iranian forces.

33. On 22 September 1993, from morning until dusk, Iraqis used 100 IFA vehicles to evacuate all their command centres stationed at the geographical coordinates of TQ 15550-11450 of Hosseineh, north of border pillar 7/19 and south of border pillar 7/20. The Iraqis then stationed commando forces dressed in black hats and camouflage fatigues in the same location.

34. On 22 September 1993, at 1535 hours, a boat belonging to the Basra Centre of Marine Sciences passed by the facilities of Khorramshahr and sailed towards Basra.

35. On 22 September 1993, at 1800 hours, eight anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and penetrated 11 kilometres into Iranian territory at the geographical coordinates of NE 7176 on the map of Baneh, north of Kondehsoor Mount and Shakh Ashkoot and border pillar 99/6. These elements barricaded the road and stopped vehicles passing through. They arrested two of the local residents and then returned to Iraq.

36. Between 22 and 23 September 1993, Iraqis reinforced and replaced their forces at the geographical coordinates of TP 241-71010 on the map of Khorramshahr, opposite Ghalileh base at the intersection of Arayez Lake and Arvand.

37. Between 22 and 23 September 1993, Iraqis replaced their forces at the geographical coordinates of TP 1575 on the map of Khorramshahr in no man's land south of border pillars 1/19, 1/20 and 1/21.

38. Between 22 and 23 September 1993, Iraqi forces stationed at the geographical coordinates of TP 19600-73400 on the map of Khorramshahr at border pillars 1/5 and 1/6 replaced their personnel with new personnel and brought in additional reinforcement.

39. On 23 September 1993, Iraqi forces reinforced and replaced their personnel at the geographical coordinates of TP 16500-74900 on the map of Khorramshahr in no man's land south of border pillar 1/15. They also reactivated a previously abandoned trench.

40. On 23 September 1993, at 1700 hours, Iranian forces in the vicinity of Bani Khalaf village at the geographical coordinates of NF 3308 on the map of Sardasht were attacked by anti-revolutionary elements who had crossed the border into the Islamic Republic of Iran. As a result, eight Iranians were martyred and six were wounded. At 1800 hours, the anti-revolutionaries returned to Iraq via border pillar 109/2.

41. On 23 September 1993, at 0400 hours, two anti-revolutionaries crossed the border and penetrated 1 kilometre into Iranian territory, west of the sentry post of Changooleh. They fired at the personnel of the post with lightweight weapons. The bullets hit the area at the geographical coordinates of 34500-46000 on the map of Kooh Toonel, north of border pillar 26/4.

42. On 24 September 1993, at 0230 hours, a number of anti-revolutionary elements penetrated 3.5 kilometres into Iranian territory at the geographical coordinates of NE 3894 on the map of Sardasht, north of border pillar 106/1, Laklak Mount, and south of border pillar 107, Heinmal Mount. They fired shots and returned to Iraqi territory when Iranian forces responded.

43. On 24 September 1993, six anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and penetrated into Iranian territory with the intention of mining the area along the southern axis of the sentry post of Ghal'eh Rash at the geographical coordinates of NE 3796 on the map of Sardasht. These elements met with resistance of local villagers and at a point north of border pillars 107/1 and 107/2 turned in the direction of Iraqi territory.

44. On 24 September 1993, 20 anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory at the geographical coordinates of NF 2835 on the map of Alavan in the village of Sepahgan. These elements were pursued by Iranian forces and returned to Iraq.

45. On 24 September 1993, a number of anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory in the village of Dashtghooreh at the geographical coordinates of NF 3534 on the map of Alavan. At 1800 hours, on the same day, they set fire to a vehicle belonging to Iranian forces and disarmed two Iranian military personnel. They then returned to Iraq.

46. On 24 September 1993, anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory in the vicinity of Somaghan village at the geographical coordinates of NE 58-98 on the map of Barisoo. They engaged in battle with the Iranian forces, four of whom were martyred as a result.

47. On 25 September 1993, at 0730 hours, Iranian soldier Keyvan Moradi was on guard duty at the Chilat observatory post at the geographical coordinates of PB 8511 on the map of Chai Gharreh Tappeh, opposite border pillar 24/18, when he was abducted by anti-revolutionaries who had entered Iranian territory. The soldier was taken to Iraqi territory.

48. On 25 September 1993, at 1930 hours, approximately 40 anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory in the vicinity of Kanisoor in the area where the Jal Nahni is stationed. They barricaded the road and stopped vehicles. These elements returned to Iraq only when they were confronted by border patrol who opened fire on them.

49. On 26 September 1993, at 0830 hours, 24 anti-revolutionary elements penetrated 4 kilometres into Iranian territory west of the city of Baneh at the geographical coordinates of NE 7683 on the map of Baneh. They engaged in a clash with Iranian forces who drove them into retreat with the help of reinforcements and shelling.

50. On 26 September 1993, at 1500 hours, 37 anti-revolutionary elements penetrated into Iranian territory at the geographical coordinates of NE 6597 on the map of Barisoo and attacked Iranian forces. As a result, one Iranian personnel was martyred and the perpetrators returned to Iraq.

51. On 26 September 1993, at 2100 hours, anti-revolutionary elements took advantage of the night to enter Iranian territory near Bardeh Rash Base at the geographical coordinates of NE 5382 on the map of Garmab between Chooman and Malteh. They ran into Iranian forces and returned to Iraq.

52. On 26 September 1993, anti-revolutionary elements took advantage of the night and planted an anti-personnel mine at the geographical coordinates of NE 3797 on the map of Sardasht, south of the sentry post of Ghal'eh Rash. At 0630 hours, a civilian vehicle belonging to a local villager hit the mine and was damaged.

53. On 27 September 1993, several anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and penetrated into Iranian territory in the vicinity of the village of Bardehsoo at the geographical coordinates of NF 3615 on the map of Alavan, north-east of border pillar 112, in the vicinity of Ziveh at the geographical coordinates of NF 3910 on the map of Sardasht, approximately 10.5 kilometres east of border pillars 110 and 110/1. These elements were pursued by Iranian forces and returned to the other side of the border.

54. On 27 September 1993, at 1400 hours, five Iraqi loaders were seen levelling the surface of the road at the geographical coordinates of ND 5424 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin.

55. On 27 September 1993, at 1830 hours, 15 anti-revolutionary elements were seen at the geographical coordinates of NE 4096 on the map of Sardasht, south of Banovan, north of Faghir Soleiman and the geographical coordinates of NE 3997 on the map of Sardasht. They were forced to return to Iraq when confronted by Iranian personnel.

56. On 27 September 1993, 30 anti-revolutionary elements armed with light and semi-light weapons crossed the border and entered Iranian territory at the geographical coordinates of NF 4218 and NF 4113 of Alavan. They were pursued by Iranian forces and driven back into Iraq.

57. On 27 September 1993, 25 anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory at the geographical coordinates of NF 3503 of Sardasht, at the village of Baveh and the geographical coordinates of NF 3903 of Sardasht at the village of Havarsoleiman and Mir Sheikh Heidar. These elements were pursued and driven across the border by Iranian personnel.

58. On 27 September 1993, 25 anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory at the geographical coordinates of NE 4298 on the map of Sardasht, at the village of Maran and the geographical coordinates of NE 4690 on the map of Barisoo, at the village of Razgah and the geographical coordinates of NE 4791 of Barisoo, at the village of Champoo. They were driven back into Iraqi territory by Iranian forces.

59. On 28 September 1993, between 2030 and 2100 hours, a number of anti-revolutionaries crossed and border and fired at the sentry post of Changooleh at the geographical coordinates of PB 34300-45300 on the map of Mehran. Iranian forces fired back, forcing them to return to Iraq.

60. On 28 September 1993, at 2100 hours, a number of anti-revolutionary elements taking advantage of the darkness of night, penetrated into Iranian territory and fired at the sentry post of Changooleh at the geographical coordinates of PB 34300-45300 on the map of Kouh Toonel north of border pillar 26/4. They returned to Iraq after facing the Iranian reaction.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gholamali KHOSHROO
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative

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UNITED
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# Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/14
7 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The members of the Security Council have taken note of your report on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) of 30 December 1993 (S/26927), on the basis of which they have completed the review provided for in paragraph 2 of resolution 872 (1993).

(Signed) Karel KOVANDA
President of the Security Council

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UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/15
7 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to present to you the attached letter from the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, dated 6 January 1994.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 6 January 1994 from the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council

This is the tenth day in a row now, before the eyes of the whole world, the Serbian aggressor has shelled Sarajevo, killing every day tens of its citizens, and destroying their homes.

Europe and the whole world continue to silently observe this tragedy. Not even by a single action have they shown their readiness to protect the city of Sarajevo and prevent its destruction.

We are asking the Security Council to finally undertake effective measures adopted in Security Council resolutions and stop the tragedy.

(Signed) Alija IZETBEGOVIC
President

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